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Case No. 870117-CA 
Priority 14b 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal From the Circuit Court, State of Utah 
Salt Lake County, Salt Lake City Department 
Honorable Maurice D. Jones, Judge 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1.- Did the Court err in finding that Plaintiff 
(Jacobsen) "loaned" Defendant (Kimball) $5,700.00 to 
purchase an automobile? 
2. Was the $5,700.00 a gift? 
3. Did the Court err in failing to consider the value 
of current goods and services furnished to Jacobsen by 
Kimball as an offset to the $5,700.00? 
A. Did the Court err in failing to find that the 
value of property returned by Kimball to Jacobsen 
constituted payment or offset to the vehicle purchase? 
5. Is the four-year Statute of Limitations a complete 
bar to the action? 
STATUTE 
78-12-25 U.C.A., 1953: 
Within four years: 
(1) an action upon a contract, obliga-
tion or liability not founded upon an 
instrument in writing; also on an open 
account for goods, wares and merchandise, 
and for any article charged in a store 
account; also on an open account for work, 
labor or services rendered, or materials 
furnished; provided, that action in all of 
the foregoing cases may be commenced at any 
time within four years after the last 
charge is made or the last payment is 
received. 
(2) an action for relief not otherwise 
provided for by law. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff and Defendant became acquainted in 1979. 
Defendant Kimball was divorced. Plaintiff Jacobsen was not 
divorced at the time, but had been separated from his wife 
for a number of years and later became divorced. Both had 
children from their prior marriages, and these children were 
in high school or beyond in 1979. Plaintiff moved into 
Defendant's home shortly after they became acquainted and 
lived there for five years, at least two years full time and 
on weekends during the balance of the time because he worked 
out of town. Marriage was contemplated by the parties but 
the relationship terminated in 1984. 
During the course of the relationship, Defendant 
Kimball provided a home for Plaintiff Jacobsen; paid all the 
household expenses, including taxes, utilities and other 
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payments; provided all the food consumed in the home, 
Plaintiff's beer and cigarettes; and an automobile and 
upkeep thereon. All of this was done without any financial 
contribution on the part of Defendant, except for the 
purchase of the automobile. A joint bank account with 
Plaintiff was opened and some $8,000.00 was deposited into 
that account; an Ed Fraughton sculpture was purchased; a 
boat was purchased; and Kimball was given a valuable silver 
bullion collection. All of these items and all funds in the 
joint account, except the car, were given to Plaintiff when 
the relationship terminated. 
This lawsuit stems from a controversy concerning the 
automobile. In early 1981, the parties were looking for an 
automobile to replace Kimball's car. On February 8, 1981, a 
suitable car was located and Jacobsen purchased the car for 
Kimball for $5,700.00. He sued for that amount on March 27, 
1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As first witness, Plaintiff called his daughter, Sallee 
Jacobsen Orr. She testified that at the time of the car 
purchase, her father maintained a joint account with her and 
that, at his request, on February 8, 1981, she made out a 
check to one Wayne Schilling, for $5,700.00 and gave the 
check to her father. Noted on the check is the statement 
for "Mollie's car11 (Tr. 14). A copy of the check (Exhibit 
1) is appended to this Brief. 
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Later, in August 1981 (Tr.18), while Mollie, Jacobsen 
and Sallee were riding in the Fiat automobile, there was a 
conversation concerning the car. Sallee was evidently upset 
with the fact that her father had purchased Mollie a car and 
had never purchased Sallee a car. Sallee felt she deserved 
a car too. Comments were made and, in response, Mollie said 
that she would put money in an account and pay Jacobsen back 
in one lump sum. Jacobsen did not enter the conversation, 
but merely told them to "ease up11 (Tr. 24). 
Douglas Jacobsen then testified, identifying the check 
(Exhibit 1) as being the check he handed to Mollie to buy a 
car. He testified that after the car had been purchased, 
there was a discussion about Mollie fs other car and he 
testified that Mollie said she would sell the older car and 
put the money received on the new car. Jacobsen responded 
by telling her to put the money in an account and when I 
need it I'll get it (Tr. 22-23). 
He remembered a conversation at the time the older Fiat 
was sold where he said he did not need the money, and Mollie 
said she would put it in a special account, add to it and 
pay him back (Tr. 24). He recalled a conversation of August 
1981 where he, Mollie and his daughter were riding in the 
new Fiat. Sallee asked about the money, and Mollie said 
that she deserved it, and said further that the money was in 
a special account and that she would pay her dad back (Tr. 
24). 
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After that, nothing was said about the car and the 
payments (Tr. 25). Jacobsen acknowledged that there was 
never a writing relative to the money for the car being a 
loan (Tr. 26). 
Carol Gordeen, a social acquaintance of both parties, 
testified that they belong to a group that met at each 
otherfs homes on weekends (Tr. 55). She recalled the Fiat 
automobile and a conversation concerning the car and state-
ments made by Jacobsen. Her testimony: 
Q (By Mr. Garrett) Just tell us 
what you remember, or who you remember 
making those statements? 
A Mr. Jacobsen showing the car to 
us, this is Molliefs new car, itfs my--you 
know, gift to Mollie, I bought this new car 
for Mollie. 
(Tr. 56) 
Mollie Kimball testified as a witness on her own 
behalf. She first became acquainted with Mr. Jacobsen in 
July 1979 and from that time until 1984, they resided 
together in her home. He lived with her on a full time 
basis for two years and the rest of the time stayed with her 
at her home on weekends because he was out of town (Tr. 38). 
In 1981, Mollie Kimball was looking for a vehicle to 
replace her car. She and Jacobsen looked at the car that 
was purchased, and she asked him to write a check for it, 
which he did (Tr. 39). At that time, she had credit with 
the credit union at LDS Hospital and would have been able to 
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borrow $5,700.00 had she needed to (Tr. 35). At the time 
the check was given, he did not make any demand that she pay 
it back (Tr. 40). She, on the other hand, told him she 
would give him the money from the sale of her old car (Tr. 
40). When the car was sold, she received approximately 
$2,800.00. The car was sold within a month or less from the 
time the new car was purchased on February 8, 1981 (Tr. 41). 
At the time the old car was sold, Mollie offered 
Jacobsen the money received. He responded by saying he 
didnft want it and told her to put it in her credit union. 
Nothing else was said (Tr. 42). 
During the period of time that the relationship 
continued, Mollie made the house payments, paid for the 
groceries, paid the utilities, all of the upkeep on the home 
(Tr. 36). Exhibit 2, in Mollie Kimball's handwriting, a 
copy of which is appended to this Brief, provides a 
breakdown of household expenses provided to Jacobsen from 
1979-1984. This exhibit is uncontraverted and shows $225.00 
per month for two years, total $5,400.00; and $20.00 per 
weekend for three years, total $3,120.00; grand total, 
$8,520.00. 
Mollie Kimball again referred to Exhibit 2 relative to 
personal property that had been given to her by Jacobsen 
during the term of their relationship. In response to a 
question about the personal property, she stated: 
A . . . I asked him one time, I 
said, it's funny, I work every week, I get 
a paycheck and it goes for expenses. You 
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work every week and buy investments, and he 
said I have you in mind with all of these 
things that I buy, I only do it with you in 
mind. 
(Tr. 51) 
This property consisted of an Ed Fraughton bronze sculpture 
- $3,500.00; silver bullion - $6,000.00; joint bank account 
- $8,000.00; and a boat - $1,200.00 (Exhibit 2). 
All of the foregoing money and items of value were 
returned to Mr. Jacobsen by Mollie Kimball when the 
relationship terminated. The total value of the property 
was $18,700.00. Of that amount, Mollie had contributed 
$100.00 on the purchase of the Fraughton sculpture and 
$800.00 on the boat. 
On the question of when the older car was sold and the 
$2,800.00 offered to Jacobsen, there may be an issue. 
Jacobsen said: 
A Oh, two--two and a half, maybe 
three months, I don't know when. 
(Tr. 23) 
Mollie Kimball testified: 
Q Do you recall saying at that 
time, I put it in the paper and tried to 
sell it, I would say within a couple of 
months? 
A I think that it was totally sold 
by then, it could have been in a month. I 
cannot put a date on that, and I told you 
before, I tried to get that date, and I 
have not been able to come up with it. 
(Tr. 52) 
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Based upon the facts as set forth above, the Court 
found: 
1. That Jacobsen loaned Kimball $5,700.00 to purchase 
a car. 
2. That Kimball told Jacobsen she would pay back the 
$5,700.00. 
3. That Kimball would pay to Jacobsen the money she 
received from the sale of her old car and the balance as she 
made it. 
4. The car was sold within a couple of months. 
Based upon those findings, the lower Court awarded 
judgment to Jacobsen in the amount of $5,700.00 with 
interest from March 10, 1981. 
Kimball filed a Motion for New Trial and a Motion to 
Amend the Findings of Fact to address the following issues: 
•1. The date the Statute of Limitations commenced to 
run; 
2. The effect of the reasonable value of the services 
and goods provided by Kimball; 
3. The effect and value of the sculpture, bullion, 
bank account and boat; and 
4. The value of the use of the vehicle by Jacobsen. 
The Court denied the Motion for New Trial and the 
Motion to Amend the Findings, but directed the entry of an 
Amended Judgment providing that interest would run only from 
the date of Judgment. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Given the relationship of the parties and the 
circumstances surrounding the purchase of the car, the Court 
erred in finding that the purchase was a loan of money 
rather than a gift. 
Jacobsen received food, shelter and care from Kimball 
in the uncontested value of $8,520.00 and the return of all 
investments of $18,700.00. The Court erred in not ruling 
that a fair division of property had occurred and that 
Jacobsen was not entitled to more by way of a judgment. 
This action was commenced over four years after the car 
was purchased for Mollie Kimball. The Court did not address 
the Statute of Limitations, although it was specifically 
pled as a defense. There was no agreement between the 
parties as to the time of repayment. Such being the case, 
the Statute commenced on the date the car was purchased, and 
the Four-Year Statute of Limitations is a complete bar. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE $5,700 CAR 
PURCHASE WAS A LOAN RATHER THAN A GIFT. 
When a party attacks the findings of a lower court, the 
standard for appellate review is as follows: 
"The standard for appellate review of factual 
findings affords great deference to the trial 
court's view of the evidence unless the trial 
court has misapplied the law or its findings are 
clearly against the weight of the evidence." 
Garcia vs. Schwendiman 645 P2d 651 (Utah). 
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A more strident view of the same rule is contained in 
Sharf vs. BMG Corporation 700 P2d 1068. 
To mount a successful attack on the trial 
court's findings of fact, an appellate must 
marshall all the evidence in support of the 
trial court's findings and then demonstrate that 
even viewing it in the light most favorable to 
the court below, the evidence is insufficient to 
support the findings. 
The same rule does not apply in an equity case. 
In equity cases our scope of review is broad, 
and this court may weigh the evidence and 
determine the facts. Bustamante vs. Bustamante 
645 P2d 40 (Utah). 
This case presents an interesting question as to 
whether it is in fact a law or equity case. At the time of 
the transaction giving rise to this lawsuit, the parties 
were living together virtually as husband and wife. The 
many transactions between them, such as the car, the joint 
bank account, the purchase of the sculpture, the purchase of 
the boat, the receipt of the silver bullion, the providing 
of food, shelter and care for a number of years, all point 
to the type of transactions occurring between husband and 
wife and not the single transaction between those dealing at 
arms' length. All of the transactions, including the car, 
must be considered. So considered, it is the equitable 
standard that should be applied in this case, rather than 
the law standard. However, even under the law standard, the 
findings of the Court are not supported by the evidence. 
The question as to property rights between parties who 
live together, although unmarried, has not been determined 
-10-
by the Utah Courts and there is no statute on the subject. 
California has addressed this matter in many cases. All are 
cited and a rule formulated in the case of Michelle Marvin 
vs. Lee Marvin 557 P2d 106. That case is commended to this 
Court . for the detailed analysis of the law and for the 
adoption of that rule. The California Court makes an 
interesting statement relative to the concept of gift. Page 
121 of the citation: 
There is no more reason to presume that services 
are contributed as a gift than to presume that 
funds are contributed as a gift; in any event, 
the better approach is to presume, as Justice 
Peters suggested, that 'the parties intended to 
deal fairly with each other1. (Keene v. Keene, 
supra, 57 Cal.2d 657, 674, 21 Cal.Rptr. 597, 
603, 371 P.2d 329, 339 (dissenting opn.); see 
Bruch, op. cit., supra, Family L.Q. , 
.) 
When examined under the concept of fairness, we find 
that Jacobsen received all of the property accumulated 
during the relationship after its termination and then 
brought suit for the balance, claiming it was a loan. If 
the Judgment is allowed to stand, he will have received 
property valued at $27,200 -- Kimball, nothing. 
There is no evidence to support the conclusion that the 
$5,700 was a loan. 
Mollie Kimball testified that when the vehicle was 
purchased, Jacobsen made no demand on her to pay the money 
back. She testified that she felt obligated to give him the 
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money received from the sale of her older car and when she 
received $2,800 for that car, she offered it to Jacobsen. 
He said he didn't want it or didnft need it at that time, 
and for her to put it in her credit union (TR 40 and TR 42). 
The testimony on the subject is vague and inconclusive 
as to the transaction being a loan. There is nothing in 
writing between the parties. Molliefs offer to pay did not 
extend beyond the offer to pay the money received from the 
sale of the old car and when in fact sold, Jacobsen rejected 
the money and told her to deposit it in an account. This 
was three years before the relationship terminated. During 
that time, there is no testimony of a demand for payment and 
no discussions concerning the automobile until this lawsuit 
was filed over four years after the money had been advanced. 
Considering the circumstances of the parties, being 
virtually husband and wife, considering also the value of 
services received by Jacobsen and the settlement and 
delivery of property values at the time the relationship 
terminated, it is clear that the Court erred in finding the 
purchase of the vehicle to be a loan. 
POINT II; THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THE VALUE 
OF PROPERTY ACCUMULATED DURING THE RELATIONSHIP 
AND THE VALUE OF SERVICES RENDERED PLAINTIFF BY 
DEFENDANT. 
Much of what is said here has been covered, in part, 
under Point I. Both Points have the same factual basis but 
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should be considered separately because the legal principles 
are somewhat distinct. 
The Complaint filed in this case alleges a loan of 
$5,700.00 to Defendant. Defendant, in her Answer, denies 
the loan and alleges affirmatively that the automobile was a 
gift. 
Exhibit 2, which shows the value of services rendered 
to Jacobsen by Kimball during the relationship and the value 
of other items of property given to her during the relation-
ship was offered as an exhibit in the nature of an offset to 
the claim of Jacobsen for $5,700.00, and also to show the 
motivation of Jacobsen in making the vehicle a gift to 
Kimball. The Court admitted the exhibit but only for the 
purpose of showing the motivation for gift, and not as an 
offset (Tr. 7). On the point of offset, Mr. Marsden, 
counsel for Jacobsen, said: 
I think that's the key issue. I might 
say the other issue from this exhibit is, 
as I understand the position, although not 
pled, they1re claiming an offset and that's 
what — this is an itemization of living 
expenses while this — these two people lived 
together, as I understand it. I think it's 
irrelevant, but that seems to be an issue 
to be decided. 
(Tr. 7) 
The Court should have admitted Exhibit 2 as an offset as it 
would in any domestic relations case under the equitable 
powers of the Court, particularly when counsel, albeit 
reluctantly, agrees that it is an issue to be tried. 
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There is no question that the Court was given an 
opportunity to consider these issues, which it refused to 
do. None of the equitable issues of a fair division of 
property are addressed in the Courtfs Findings and Conclu-
sions (Record, 38-39). The Court was given a further 
opportunity to address these issues in Defendant's Motion to 
Amend the Findings of Fact and Motion for New Trial (Record, 
32-34) . The Court refused and entered an Order denying the 
Motion to Amend and the Motion for New Trial (Record, 
46-47). 
Although our courts have not considered the precise 
issue of a fair division of property when parties live 
together, the lower court was not entirely without precedent 
in this matter. In the Utah case of Jenkins vs. Jenkins, 
153 P. 2d 262, the parties contracted a marriage at a time 
when the divorce of the wife was interlocutory only and had 
not become final. The Supreme Court ruled that the later 
marriage was void and not validated by continued cohabita-
tion. The defendant contended that the only power of the 
lower court under those circumstances was to dismiss the 
case. The Supreme Court ruled to the contrary and said that 
the lower court had the equitable power to provide for a 
disposition of property and custody and support of the minor 
child born to the parties. 
Already addressed in Point I is the value of services 
rendered Jacobsen by Kimball and his statement, not 
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contraverted, that the property he purchased and gave or 
delivered to her was done only with her in mind. 
It was error for the Court not to make findings on 
those issues which were clearly presented in the evidence. 
Fairness would dictate that the Court below should have 
considered the matter of fairness, at least under the 
concept of gift set forth in the pleadings or, more precise-
ly, under the concept of a fair division of property. 
POINT III: THE FOUR-YEAR STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS A BAR TO 
THE ACTION (78-12-25). 
The check for the car was written on February 8, 1981, 
the car purchased that day. Suit was brought by Jacobsen on 
March 7, 1985, a period of time in excess of four years. 
There is no comment in the Findings on the Statute of 
Limitations defense. In the Motion to Amend Findings and 
Motion for New Trial, the Court was invited to address the 
issue of when the Statute began to run. It refused, denying 
the Motions. 
The evidence on this point is not in serious conflict 
and is contained in the testimony of Plaintiff and 
Defendant. The best case Plaintiff can make on this point 
is that on the date he purchased the vehicle for Mollie 
Kimball, he did not set a time for payment and when Mollie 
offered to pay, he simply stated, put the money in the 
account, I'll let you know when I need it. He stated this 
again when he was offered the money from the old car that 
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had been sold. It must be concluded that there was no 
agreement as to repayment. 
Cases construing similar situations have held that such 
a loan is repayable immediately and the statute begins to 
run on the date the loan was made. 
These cases are collected in 14 A.L.R.4th 1385. From 
the annotation: 
Thus, in the circumstances of the following 
cases, the courts held or recognized that 
statutes of limitation begin to run on 
actions based on oral promises to pay 
money, which did not contain provisions for 
the time of repayment, from the date the 
promises were made. 
Plaintiff will direct the attention of the Court, as he 
directed the lower court, to the case of OfHair vs. 
Kounalis, 463 P. 2d 799 (Utah). In that case, suit was 
commenced 5% years after the loan had been made and arrived 
at the Supreme Court by way of summary judgment procedures. 
The lower Court held that the action was barred by the 
four-year statute. The Supreme Court reversed for trial on 
the merits to determine whether or not there was a loan, 
whether the parties intended payments to be made at a future 
time, whether a date of payment could be established, and 
what constituted a reasonable time under the circumstances. 
The plaintiff's version of the case which necessitated a 
factual determination was that it was the intention of the 
parties that repayment was to be made but was not to be made 
for some number of years in the future. 
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Our case is clearly distinguishable. In the O'Hair 
case, money was to be repaid but not for some five years in 
the future. In our case, there was to be no payment until 
demanded. There is a vast conceptual difference between the 
two types of cases. Where a loan is made (Defendant denies 
it was a loan), the lender has a right to set the terms and 
if that lender simply states I'll let you know when I want 
the money, it is a demand loan, the cause of action accrues 
from when the loan is made, and the statute of limitations 
begins to run on that date. 
CONCLUSION 
During the five-year period that Plaintiff and 
Defendant lived together, there were a number of 
transactions between them, such as an $8,000.00 joint 
account, the purchase of several items for investment, and 
the purchase of a vehicle. The appropriate decision in this 
case would be for this Court to conclude that the return of 
all the invested items, including the $8,000.00 joint 
account, to Plaintiff was a fair settlement of property 
rights and that the vehicle or its proceeds retained by 
Plaintiff was a fair settlement to her, which in some 
measure would compensate her for maintaining and paying for 
all the groceries and expenses on a home of benefit to 
Plaintiff. 
On the other hand, if the Court chooses not to 
determine the case on the basis of equitable division of 
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property between these two people, then at all events, the 
claim of Plaintiff for $5,700.00 is barred by the Four-Year 
Statute of Limitations. If that fails, the case should be 
referred back to the lower Court for a new trial on the 
various issues. 
Respectfully submitted this >•"] day of July, 1987. 
GARRETT AND STURDY 
By 'r*. 
Edward M. Garrett 
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